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In Chapter IV of his Schreiben und Denken, the Austrian linguist Hanspeter Ortner distinguishes 
and describes ten writing strategies (“Schreibstrategien”). One of them is “syncretistic writing”.1 A 
simple application of Ortner’s definition and description of syncretistic writing to the genesis of the 
Philosophical Investigations (PI) makes clear that the PI can be said to be of syncretistic origin.2 
Wittgenstein’s writing of the PI3 can be characterized by Ortner’s seven features of syncretistic: his 
writing (1) hops all over the place (“Sprunghaftigkeit”); (2) combines disparate elements from his 
writings (“Verbindung von weit Auseinanderliegendem”); (3) is semantically open, under-
determined and under-determining (“Unterdeterminiertheit und semantische Offenheit”); (4) 
postpones gestalt formation/elaboration (“Aufschub der Gestaltbildung”); (5) invites and offers 
many opportunities for creative ideas (“viele Chancen für und Einladungen an den kreativen 
Einfall”); (6) gives freedom to choose the points of departure and reference (“Freiheit bei der Wahl 
des/der Startpunktes/e und des/der Gesichtspunktes/e”); (7) is hierarchically under-determined 
(“hierarchische Unterbestimmtheit”); (8) works side-by-side with the already ”finished” and the 
newly begun which implies long text building processes and parallel operations (“lange ‘Bauzeit’ 
und Nebeneinander von Fertiggestelltem und Neubegonnenem”).4  
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In the following, I will try to show in more detail how the genesis of the PI is characterized 
by these seven features. First, the writings that constitute the PI’s genesis are characterized by a 
strong discrepancy between the sequence of remarks in their textual order and the sequence of 
remarks in their physical order. Texts are put together from chronologically and argumentatively 
dispersed units. One example is Wittgenstein’s rearrangement of remarks from an earlier dictation 
(TS 208) into a new text in 1930 (TS 209, published by Rush Rhees as Philosophical Remarks). In 
this new text, he abandoned both the original argumentative order and the chronological order and 
did not necessarily obey the criteria of consistency and coherence, not even on linguistic levels 
such as demonstrative reference. The work that emerges is seen by many as an unordered 
agglomerate of remarks although I have argued that this view can be challenged.5 The second 
example is the revision and rearrangement of the so-called Big Typescript (TS 213) in 1933-34, 
which is paradigmatic in its triple use of (1) the text in the typescript, (2) the handwritten revisions 
of it in the typescript, and (3) text in other manuscripts. In his edition of the Philosophical 
Grammar (1969), Rush Rhees has tried to take this complicated network of revisions into account 
and to follow it painstakingly and faithfully; by looking at the manuscript sources for this edition6 
one realizes how much “hopping all over the place” was going on in the originals. Thirdly, MS 142, 
the “Urfassung” of the PI, was produced in 1936–37 from remarks stemming from different places 
in manuscripts and typescripts and various loci of discourse. MS 157b, 13v, contains a list of 
references to pages in TS 213 from which parts of the text were to be taken to write the 
“philosophy chapter” of this first PI version; other sources include MS 140 (last page), MS 152, MS 
156a, MS 156b and MS 157a, all yielding materials, lists and drafts for the text of MS 142. The final 
example is TS 228: in the later stages of the PI genesis, Wittgenstein selected about 400 remarks 
from this typescript to include them in TS 227, the typescript used as the printer’s copy for the PI.  
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The presence of these features alone, hopping all over the place and combining disparate 
elements, would not be sufficient to establish syncretistic origin. However, the PI genesis is also 
marked by other features of the syncretistic such as openness and semantic under-determinacy. 
This includes forms of textual variation: when writing the PI, Wittgenstein makes heavy use of 
(diachronic and synchronic) variants (the latter, typically occurring within one and the same 
remark, I call “alternatives”). Three examples, all taken from the genesis of the first sections of the 
PI, may suffice. In July 1931, Wittgenstein embarks on a long-lasting discussion of “the mistake” 
Augustine made in the description of how he had learnt language (Confessiones I/8). But his 
account of what this mistake actually consisted of varies from text to text. Even in the PI it is not 
clear what the mistake was that Augustine made: one part states that Augustine’s description of 
learning language does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that different word classes exist since 
it suggests that there is only one word class, namely the class of names (PI, §1). Other parts 
attribute to Augustine the belief that all words are names (PI, §6). PI §6 states that Augustine does 
not even describe language correctly in relation to names; in contrast to this, however, §§3-4 
concede that Augustine does correctly describe language with regard to names. Again other parts 
suggest that Augustine’s description reveals a mistake of attitude rather than a mistake of 
reasoning: neither a wrong position nor a faulty generalization lies at the heart of Augustine’s 
description, but rather an attitude of neglect or of drawing our attention to only one aspect (PI, §1). 
The second example concerns the issue of how, in different variants, Bedeutung (meaning) is 
related to Hindeuten (pointing):7 in the first versions, Hindeuten seems to be the basic notion from 
which Bedeutung is derived, but the PI Urfassung suggests the idea that Bedeutung is the primitive 
form. The third example again relates to Augustine’s mistake: What lies behind it? Is it such a 
simple thing as a wrong description of language learning, or is the wrong description already the 
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expression and result of a wrong, “primitive” conception of the world? Different answers are given 
in the genesis of the PI. Wittgenstein’s investment in producing textual variants is impressive.8 
Both the diachronic variants at different points in the history of the texts and the alternatives within 
a remark document and bear semantic under-determinacy and openness. They can introduce new 
perspectives on a subject or open up different lines for proceeding further into it. And, as we have 
seen, not even the “final” PI is free from semantic openness, nor from either textual or conceptual 
ambiguity.9 
As the exact meaning of remarks is often left open, or as the meaning of the text is not 
always fixed but multiplied and varied, so too is the form of the work: the genesis of the PI is, in 
some places, characterized by conscious enrichment with further gestalts, and generally a 
postponing of the fixation of gestalt. It is clear that after his return to Cambridge in 1929 
Wittgenstein aimed to produce a new book that was to be published,10 but that he did not come up 
with a satisfactory vision of the form of this book until November 1936. Even after having gained 
such a vision, he did not succeed in bringing the work to publication in his lifetime. One reason for 
this was surely that he never had the feeling of having put the absolutely right content into the 
absolutely right form. His biggest problem was to find a way to avoid both the scylla of a collection 
of aphorisms and the charybdis of a closed hierarchy and taxonomy. In the Tractatus he had 
achieved cohesion and focus through strong ties of textual connectors (with a is b, b is c, c is d … 
as a fundamental gestalt principle)11 and a hierarchical tree-structure12 – but the PI would become 
an “album” of fragments.13 We find a few other attempts at structuring that lie in between these two 
forms, among them two more academic ones: the hierarchical one in TS 213 (1933-34) and the 
attempt at rigid step-by step linear structuring in the Brown Book complex (1935-36). Wittgenstein 
abandoned both these attempts at more standard academic forms, the latter with harsh criticism in 
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late autumn 1936 (see MS 115, 292). What came after the Brown Book? The album form. But is 
the PI album a form whose gestalt principles are easy to recognize? Although I find it very 
difficult, I will later in this chapter make an attempt to see and understand the form principles of the 
PI, considering the fact that Wittgenstein calls his PI an “album”.  
The PI preface clearly tells us that Wittgenstein had at different times held different views 
regarding the form his book should take. It is also clear that he had a vision from early on: “the 
essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order 
and without breaks.” The author of the PI abandoned that vision in late 1936, or he re-conceived 
what “natural order” should mean. What he ended up with was a form that permitted him “to travel 
over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction“. Thus, he settled on a form which not 
only permitted him to proceed with very little closed gestalt but also demanded further gestalt-
shaping from the reader. The preface makes an important point: it is the philosophical investigation 
itself which compels us to such philosophical criss-cross travelling. The PI’s non-linear album form 
is thus a response to a requirement. But neither the postponing of gestalt-formation nor the choice 
of an open gestalt such as the album prevents or frees the writer from at least sometimes drafting 
text and content arrangement and sequence. Therefore, lists of remarks and content tables find their 
natural place in the PI genesis also after 1936. An album does not lack a gestalt, but rather has a 
very specific gestalt, a gestalt that is crucially different from a text book. A form which develops 
and promotes openness and criss-crossing is not a form without structure, but rather a form with a 
structure that does exactly that: it develops, maintains and promotes openness and criss-crossing. 
This form could not be a hierarchical one. While the genesis of the Tractatus may be seen as 
crucially involving attempts at diminishing hierarchical under-determinacy, the genesis of the PI is 
characterized by a departure from fighting hierarchical under-determinacy. Therefore, the album 
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form is not to be regarded as a shortcoming in achievement, or as the achievement of no form, but 
as an achievement of a special kind. The alternative to hierarchy and linearity is not no form, but 
just a very different form which shall enable both the author and the reader to do in better ways 
what they can also do with hierarchy and linearity, and, in addition, to do other things which they 
cannot do with hierarchy and linearity. Clearly, invitations to and opportunities for creative ideas as 
well as giving (to both the author and the reader) freedom to choose the points of departure and 
reference needed are better taken care of by a criss-cross album form than by a hierarchical and 
linear form.14 
The PI genesis is characterized by the co-existence of the already “finished” and the newly 
begun. While indeed some of the remarks that made it into the PI underwent little textual change 
since their first drafts and were thus fully formed on their first building, others were subjected to a 
long process of construction and re-construction: perhaps they were first erected in one form and 
then taken apart and combined anew with others – all this over many years. Let us look again at the 
first sections of the PI, more specifically §§1-4, which has subsisted as a unit since the beginning of 
1931. None of the sentences of the “final” TS 227 version had been there from the beginning in 
1931, but some of them had still been “sort of there” and underwent relatively little change 
thereafter.15 In terms of changes on conceptual levels, the first idea of bringing in Augustine’s 
description was to use it as a positive object of comparison: Augustine’s description is too simple a 
description of (how we learn) language, but still a correct description of a language simpler than 
ours. This use of and perspective on Augustine’s description is also present in the last version. 
From 1936 onwards,16 however, although the earlier approach was not given up, a different and 
clearly negative tone becomes more dominating: Augustine’s description is the expression and 
documentation of a primitive view of language (or even the world) which is at the basis of much 
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philosophical confusion and leads to many problems. Augustine’s description and the views it 
embodies become one of the main targets, if not the key targets, of the PI. A different case, 
however, is the history of PI §§89-133. While one can say that most of PI §§1-4 existed from the 
beginning as a discursive unit, this never seems to have been so for the remarks from the 
philosophy chapter before 1937 (and it is disputed whether they even are actually in the PI17). Some 
of this “chapter’s” remarks are first found in separate and dispersed places and were only bundled 
together in the making of TS 213.18 They did not, however, pass over from TS 213, the Big 
Typescript, to the PI without significant change, but in the spring of 1937 underwent a thorough 
revision which focused on what particular conception of philosophy they (and the PI Urfassung as a 
whole) should promote. Clearly, the author believed that they – in their TS 213 version – had 
carried a wrong conception. In the course of this revision, some remarks and passages were left out 
while new ones emerged and were included.19 
In this section I have tried to show that it makes good sense to look at the origin of the PI as 
being strongly syncretistic in Hanspeter Ortner’s terms. However, whether one is actually willing to 
acknowledge the features of the PI genesis described here as characteristic for the writing and text 
work which led up to Wittgenstein’s PI may depend on one’s view of the question as to whether the 
function of syncretistic writing can be more than just preliminary. Additionally, it may also depend 
on one’s view and evaluation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical programme. Ortner himself classifies 
Wittgenstein as a “puzzle-writer”.20 I think he does so, firstly, on the basis of attributing to 
Wittgenstein a vision of philosophy which cannot permit the syncretistic to be more than a stage to 
be overcome, and, secondly, on the basis of his (Ortner’s) own specific view of what both 
philosophy and scholarly writing are or should be. While Ortner may admit that the genesis of the 
PI bears marks of the syncretistic, he tries to find in this genesis something, in his view, “better” 
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than merely syncretistic writing, precisely because he considers the syncretistic as something to be 
overcome and as perceived by Wittgenstein himself as something to be overcome. In contrast to 
this, I hold that an analysis of the PI genesis which is “ideologically” unbiased to the largest 
possible degree will end up classifying the author of the PI as a syncretistic writer. I additionally 
want to argue that the syncretistic – in the sense introduced by Ortner, but applied not only to text 
production (writing) but also to text forming (the making of works) – is in tune with Wittgenstein’s 
own understanding and description of what philosophy and philosophical investigation is. 
Consequently, I not only regard Wittgenstein as the author of the PI as a syncretistic writer, but I 
also look at the PI’s philosophy as “syncretistic philosophy”: a philosophy which defends and 
promotes the features of the syncretistic as natural and necessary aspects of doing philosophy. This 
is indeed in contrast to Ortner’s normative conception of writing which embodies the ideal of 
linearly ordered writing and composition. The opposition between the syncretistic on the one hand 
and Ortner’s ideal on the other is brought up by Ortner himself; as he explicitly says, the 
syncretistic is the opposite of “discursive linearity”.21 Thus, both Ortner and the PI author see a 
contrast between the two: Ortner values the second higher than the first; interestingly, the author of 
the PI, however, welcomes and requires, even for the purpose of work forming, the first and 
dismisses the second. 
While Ortner himself regards Wittgenstein as a “puzzle-writer”, he still develops a concept 
of the syncretistic which is fully applicable to the PI genesis. As said, I disagree with Ortner’s 
classification of Wittgenstein as a “puzzle-writer” and assume that our disagreement stems from 
different views regarding what syncretistic writing and philosophy, as conceived by the 
Wittgenstein of the PI, can and should achieve, and how. At the same time, I stand entirely on the 
shoulders of Ortner’s work and use his concept of syncretistic writing not only for the study of the 
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PI genesis but also of its form. Looking at the relation between the genesis and the form of a work, 
we are faced with a potential asymmetry: the fact that the genesis of a work is syncretistic does not 
imply that the work itself is syncretistic too. Many writers work syncretistically,22 but their results 
will still not be syncretistic. The genesis of some of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was definitely 
syncretistic – but the final work was not. Therefore, the fact that the PI has not only a syncretistic 
origin, but also a syncretistic form deserves considerable attention. In the next section, I will first 
elaborate on the claim that the PI really is of syncretistic form. Then I will (try to) give further 
reasons why the PI has received this form. I will, however, in this chapter not be able to do more 
than just scratch the surface of the big question concerning what we should make of the syncretistic 





“Syncretistic” literally means “combining”: the combining of beliefs and views, but also practices 
(especially in the field of “Weltanschauung”), in ways that can even be incoherent or inconsistent. 
A work combining a wide range of different and varied methodological approaches and stylistic 
features such as the PI23 is syncretistic in this non-technical sense. Ortner acknowledges this use of 
“syncretistic”.24 In addition, “syncretistic” has for Ortner a specific sense: lacking linear-discursive 
order.25 This is an issue explicitly addressed by the PI as well and clearly expressed in its preface. 
The preface stresses two points: not only does the PI lack linear-discursive order, but it even 
opposes it; and it does so with a fundamentum in re, not only in homine. The PI does not literally 
speak of “syncretistic”, but of “album” (PI, Preface). How do “album” and the syncretistic relate to 
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each other? Does “album” add something which is not contained in “syncretistic”? In the following 
section, I will first reflect upon what an album is and then see how this reflection can relate to the 
syncretistic. I start by identifying characteristic features of an album (e.g. a photo album): 
 
 Albums are collections of units assembled for later inspection. 
 Albums assemble what already exists in its own right before the album; what makes an album 
specific and new is the particular arrangement or composition of the items.  
 Albums do not need to be complete and comprehensive in order to be albums.  
 There can be different ways of arranging the items in an album (the chronological one, the 
thematic one …), and different ways of reading and looking at the album.  
 Albums can give different and diverging views of one and the same object. No statement needs 
to be made about whether a particular view is correct, and the criss-cross relations between 
these views is often under-explicated and under-documented. 
 Albums can contain representations of items from a wide range of different situations without 
needing to make something out of this diversity. 
 
In what sense can the PI be an album? This I understand to be a question about the form of the PI. 
So, to answer it, let us first try to identify central features of the form of the PI. Then, in a 
subsequent step, we can see whether PI features of form match album features: 
 
 The PI text is composed of remarks (mostly fragments, not aphorisms).26 
 The PI text is the result of a careful arrangement of what has been elsewhere before. 
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 In the PI, not all the topics which one might expect to be discussed are in fact discussed, and the 
topics discussed are not discussed comprehensively. 
 In the PI, the same topic is often dealt with in many different places and from different 
perspectives – and one and the same remark often addresses several topics. 
 The PI displays incoherence, inconsistency, ambiguity and textual openness; the internal 
structure of cross-reference is under-explicated and under-documented in the PI. 
 The PI contains both real-life and invented cases / samples.27 
 
Every analyst of the PI’s form should be able to agree with this list of form features of the PI. 
While one need not think of an “album” at all in order to come up with this list, I think that many 
will still be able to agree that the items in the list can be regarded as exemplifications of the more 
general album features. We can thus say that the two lists match well and that there seems to be an 
intimate relationship between the form of the PI and what we understand by “album”. But can we 
also say that the PI’s album form stands in an intimate relationship to the syncretistic? Is there 
something which all three, the PI, albums and the syncretistic, have in common? According to 
Ortner’s own understanding, it is non-linearity which characterizes the syncretistic, and, according 
to Wittgenstein, it is the non-linear criss-cross form which also characterizes his PI “album”. I do 
not think that albums by their very nature are non-linear, but the album form definitely invites non-
linear composition and also reception. It seems to me now that what I have earlier called “album in 
the wide sense”,28 and what includes stylistic multiplicity and polyphony, is better described in 
terms of the syncretistic. Yet there is another feature of the PI which is well captured by 
“syncretistic”: the heuristic and creative functions of its form. Again, Ortner confines this function 
of syncretistic writing to writing, the process of text production only,29 but it seems to me that we 
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need not and should not confine it in this way. It can be a feature also of the resulting work and the 
way it shall be read: “I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, 
if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.” (PI, Preface) In my view, the syncretistic 
has an epistemic-heuristic and creative role both in the production and in the reception of the text.30 
At first sight it may seem rather unimportant and irrelevant to try to find out why Ortner 
classifies Wittgenstein as a puzzle-writer rather than a syncretistic writer. It may also seem 
unimportant to ask why he restricts the syncretistic to text production and consequently does not 
speak of syncretistic works. But trying to answer these questions actually helps us to gain a better 
understanding not only of what is at stake with Ortner’s assessment, but also of what was at stake 
for Wittgenstein when he left behind the Brown Book complex and began in the autumn of 1936 
what today is called the PI “Urfassung”. An important question for him at this time must have been 
whether philosophy can benefit more from non-linear and criss-cross writing and composition than 
from work oriented towards linearity and text book systematicity: could it even be imperative that 
he adopts non-linear criss-cross procedures for the treatment of philosophical problems? The PI 
preface answers this question clearly in the affirmative. Most philosophers and academics, 
however, would answer no. So too does Ortner: first of all, he does not apply the notion of the 
syncretistic to anything other than text production; the syncretistic is a feature of text genesis only. 
Secondly, even if the syncretistic was also a feature of works, for Ortner it could not have a 
distinctive positive value. For Ortner, as for most of us, the syncretistic is only “on the way to” 
something better, and it is to be overcome by that something better: 
 
“The Philosophical Investigations and Syncretistic Writing” (Draft!), publ. in: N. Venturinha (ed.): The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Routledge 2013. 
 
 13 
  “Syncretism is a way of working which the tentative and experimenting intellect applies if it 
cannot cope with a way of working that is more elaborated, or if it does not yet have a way of 
working that is more elaborated …” 
 “The heyday of syncretism is the incubation period …” 
 “With syncretism, the writer wants to expand the status-quo in order to coherently and 
consistently integrate new parts of the world into the already developed knowledge base.” 
 “Syncretistic writing is writing which searches to establish higher (= better) gestalts, and for 
that purpose continuously has to revise and break down lower gestalts.”31 
 
But is this necessarily so? Can we not accept that the syncretistic may be an author’s preferred 
method, even if s/he is capable of the other, “better” methods and strategies? “The heyday of 
syncretism is the incubation period”: can the syncretistic not have an equally important function at 
the time of completion and reception? Was the PI’s syncretistic form not consciously chosen as the 
better one, with a focus on both the problems to be treated and the reader to be inspired and helped 
– chosen by someone whom we consider to be one of the 20th century’s most important 
philosophers? Consequently, the value of syncretistic writing would not only be as a means of 
incubation, and therefore not only an author’s writing device, but would have a function for 
forming the work? Could it have a function for the reader too? When Ortner says that with 
syncretistic writing the writer actually seeks to expand the status quo to more coherent and 
consistent higher gestalts, is he really still talking of syncretistic writing – or is he rather ascribing 
to syncretistic writing a function which it in fact does not have according to his own definition, and 
which it should not have either? Here we find ourselves not only at the centre of normative writing 
theory, but also at the centre of the difficulties of Wittgenstein scholarship: can we utilize 
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Wittgenstein well by trying to do criss-cross philosophy in the PI spirit rather than by first 
identifying and then applying discursive-linear strands of argument in his work? Can we do it for 
academic philosophy? Wittgenstein himself seems to have been rather pessimistic about the 
influence he might have. Like Ortner, most of us seem to be held captive by the picture (PI, §115) 
that progress in writing and thinking is progress in respect to the following points: gestalt-
elaboration, continuous integration, improved consistency and coherence, linearity. In this model, 
syncretistic writing can never be more than an element and a phase of text production which is to 
be overcome by something better, and – since syncretistic forming is by definition something to be 
avoided – it is even more unlikely ever to be considered a positive principle of work forming. One 
is inclined to agree with Ortner:32 syncretistic writing should typically be practised by 
inexperienced writers only, or, when used by experienced writers, overcome when they are about to 
produce the work to be published. Nevertheless, we must face the fact that an eminent thinker and 
writer such as Wittgenstein thought differently and challenged our view with his PI. It is in fact 
precisely this dominant view of ours that the PI opposed, and to which it tried to present an 
alternative. 
The PI is usually seen as a continuation of the Brown Book. Thus, the similarities of the 
two texts are emphasized more than their differences. This blurs fundamental differences between 
the two in form and method: while the Brown Book focuses on linearity, step-by-step procedure 
and systematicity, the PI employs a criss-cross procedure. The very method which was central to 
the Brown Book and was indeed its backbone – the linear language-game method – was ”de-
linearized” and ”fragmentized”33 in the transition to the PI.34 According to Rush Rhees’ editorial 
note to Eine Philosophische Betrachtung, Wittgenstein had dismissed the Brown Book enterprise 
on the basis of wrong method: Moore told Rhees that Wittgenstein had told him (Moore) that in the 
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Brown Book he had followed the wrong method, but in this manuscript [TS 220] he had applied the 
correct method.35 What was the Brown Book’s wrong method; which is the right one? In the 1938 
PI preface drafts, Wittgenstein says: “I begin these publications with the fragment of my last 
attempt to arrange my philosophical thoughts in an ordered sequence. This fragment has perhaps 
the advantage of giving comparatively easily an idea of my method.”36 There has been some 
discussion about which “fragment” this was which Wittgenstein wanted to begin his publication 
with in 1938. I suggested it was MS 142 (or its typed version TS 220) which he began immediately 
after the abandonment of the German translation of the Brown Book in MS 115.37 The 1938 
preface drafts make it clear that Wittgenstein wants to start his publication(s) with a) the 
“fragment” of his last attempt at ordering his philosophical thoughts in a series, and that this 
fragment b) shows his method. Which method this is is clearly described in the same drafts: it is the 
method of criss-crossing rather than the method of linearity. Now, whereas the Brown Book 
complex is an example of the method of linearity, in MS 142 it is the method of criss-crossing 
which is exemplified. Wittgenstein says in both the preface drafts and the final PI preface that this 
method was an adequate response to the nature of the investigation; the criss-cross method was 
responding to the demands of the subject area, and was thus responding to a requirement. From 
this, I think, we should be able to infer not only that “fragment” refers to MS 142 / TS 220, but also 
that in 1936 the criss-cross method had been consciously upheld and transferred from the writing of 
the PI remarks (1929–1936) to their forming into the PI work (1936): it had been transferred from 
the process to the product.38 
In this chapter I have so far tried to show that the PI has a syncretistic genesis and that the 
principles of the syncretistic were also employed in the late autumn of 1936 for the creation of the 
PI form: the PI is not only of syncretistic origin but also of syncretistic form. That in the PI the 
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principles of genesis were also made the principles of form I considered significant. I have drawn 
attention to the PI preface which documents and defends this move with reference to the nature of 
the philosophical investigation required. I will conclude this chapter by trying to give my analysis 
of Wittgenstein’s choice of syncretistic form yet more substance by relating it to some additional 
reflections about possible reasons for making the PI the way he did. After all, if the Tractatus was 
(at least partly) of syncretistic origin and did in fact not end up in syncretistic form, why should the 
PI have ended up as being syncretistic? Why was the syncretistic chosen for the PI? One of the 
reasons may have been that the syncretistic was more in tune with the nature of the writer than any 
other form; the syncretistic may thus have been chosen out of an ideal of authenticity and sincerity. 
The PI product should mirror and be in harmony with the PI text production, and with the author‘s 
own writing nature.39 Moreover, the syncretistic may have been chosen out of opposition to a 
philosophy of “progress”: the syncretistic PI form was to promote or preserve an alternative to 
scientific philosophy as defended by Bertrand Russell or Rudolf Carnap, or at least: a space for 
something which is needed in addition to scientific procedure. This is most strongly expressed in a 
draft to a preface six years earlier, where for the first time criss-cross procedure is positively 
described and opposed to linear procedure:  
 
Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, the same thing over and 
over again & it is as though they were [alternative: they are as it were] views of one object 
seen from different angles. … One movement orders one thought to the others in a series, the 
other keeps aiming at the same place. 




One movement constructs & takes (in hand) one stone after another, [alternative: picks up 
one stone after another] the other keeps reaching for the same one. (CV, 9 ff.)40 
 
Compare this with what Rudolf Carnap says in the preface to his The Logical Structure of the 
World: “… in slow careful construction insight after insight will be won. … Thus stone will be 
carefully added to stone and a safe building will be erected at which each following generation can 
continue to work.”41 These two reasons cannot of course be separated from the PI’s conception of 
philosophy and its conception of the nature of philosophical problems itself. We may also want to 
relate the fact that the PI received a syncretistic and criss-crossing album form, and retained it until 
its last version, to the role the PI was to have as a work “in contrast to the Tractatus”, as is also 
stated in the PI preface: “It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the 
new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against 
the background of my old way of thinking.” There is one aspect to this which has been strongly 
emphasized recently by James Conant: PI §133 defends that in philosophy we have to use many 
methods rather than only one. While the Tractatus had followed basically one method, the PI 
introduces, follows and defends many methods: “There is not a philosophical method, though there 
are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (PI, §133) Conant thinks there is a “distinction in 
philosophical conception between the methodological monism of the early Wittgenstein (who seeks 
to present the method of clarification) and the methodological pluralism of a later Wittgenstein 
(who seeks to present an open-ended series of examples of methods – a series that can be continued 
in both unforeseen and unforeseeable ways – and that can be broken off at any point). … This 
transition from a definite article (“the” logic of our language) in Early Wittgenstein to a plurality 
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(“grammars”) in Middle Wittgenstein presages and prepares the ground for a subsequent transition, 
yet again from a definite article (“the” method) in Middle Wittgenstein to a further plurality 
(“methods”) in Later Wittgenstein. …”42 Not only the ”early” but also the “middle” Wittgenstein 
had, in contrast to the Wittgenstein who made the PI, aspired to produce a work with one method 
only.43  
The PI holds that philosophy needs many methods. But what are these methods to be 
derived from? From philosophy’s own problems – the “many” methods shall be derived from the 
ways one struggles or has struggled with one’s philosophical problems:  
 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. … We must do away 
with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its 
light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. (PI, §109) 
 
And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this 
compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. (PI, Preface) 
 
The nature of philosophical problems is such that they are multi-layered and multi-rooted.44 Their 
treatment compels us to philosophical criss-cross travelling; Wittgenstein had been travelling in this 
way since 1929 – but sometimes (e.g. when producing the Brown Book) he had forgotten that he 
was doing this, and should be doing precisely this. It is syncretistic writing more than any other 
type of writing that permits one to develop and utilize many different methods. It is the syncretistic 
as a form of the work which again asks the reader to engage in the many different methods and 
perspectives. This way the syncretistic can find its powerful way into the PI: 




The forms of creativity required for the discovery of fruitful methods in philosophy and the 
forms of creativity required for the fruitful application of such methods to particular 
problems of philosophy are recognized by Later Wittgenstein as two aspects of a single 
task, each of which requires an unending cultivation of the other.45 
 
At the beginning of Chapter IV of his Schreiben und Denken, Hanspeter Ortner also discusses 
differences between writing that shares knowledge, writing that expands knowledge and writing 
that creates new knowledge.46 What is syncretistic writing best at? Probably not knowledge 
sharing, but rather the extension of existing knowledge and the creation of new knowledge.47 
Syncretistic writing is actually a strategy central to epistemic-heuristic writing, the writing which 
has the creation of new knowledge as its primary cognitive function. Is it even the case that through 
syncretistic writing and syncretistic form we can gain knowledge which is not available otherwise? 
Gottfried Gabriel thinks that not only science and logical reasoning, but also literature and the 
poetic have a cognitive value.48 In a recent interview he states: 
 
We cannot equate the academic form of philosophy with philosophy in general. Being 
scientific is not a necessary condition for cognition. Arts and literature also have a cognitive 
value. … That’s why I think that what we need is a reconciliation of logical and poetic 
discourse. Both forms of discourse are fully justified, depending on what the concrete aim 
of articulation is. They do not necessarily oppose one another. … just as there are smooth 
transitions in the color spectrum, so that you can go from red to green, there are also 
intermediate forms in philosophy. The thesis that the different forms of philosophy are 
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complementary concerns not only the extremes, but also these in-between cases. Ultimately, 
the issue at stake is a reconciliation of analytic and continental philosophy by means of 
analyzing the transitions among the different forms of philosophy.49 
 
According to Gabriel, both analytic and continental philosophy (where a place for the poetic is 
retained) are required for the creation of philosophical knowledge and expertise. The poetic and 
literary on the one hand and the analytic on the other are complementary and add both to cognition 
and truth. Wittgenstein’s PI represents an intermediate form in philosophy, mediating between the 
analytic and the continental. 
I have tried to show in this chapter that the Wittgenstein of the PI saw the syncretistic 
(which belongs under the poetic and literary) as required for philosophical engagement. In a 
notebook entry from December 1933 Wittgenstein had stated:  
 
I believe I summed up where I stand in relation to philosophy when I said: really one should 
write philosophy only as one writes a poem. That, it seems to me, must reveal how far my 
thinking belongs to the present, the future, or the past. For I was acknowledging myself, 
with these words, to be someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do. 
(CV, 28)50 
 
This remark stands in remarkable contrast to Carnap’s opposition to “Dichtung” in philosophy, as 
Carnap had expressed it in his preface to the Aufbau: “… Consequently they have taken the strict 
and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, 
while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. … This requirement for 
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justification and conclusive foundation of each thesis will eliminate all speculative and poetic work 
from philosophy. …”.51 We can say that Wittgenstein – if the Tractatus was his first work of 
“Dichtung” in philosophy (something Gabriel would assert) – achieved with the PI Urfassung his 
second. While the Brown Book had been poor in terms of the poetic, in MS 142 the dialogical, the 
metaphorical, the simile, the analogical and the means which I have described above as elements of 
the syncretistic are given philosophical functionality.52 One example is the PI §18: it invites the one 
who philosophizes in Carnap’s spirit to look at language in a way which is guided by a liberating 
metaphor. Bouwsma writes that Wittgenstein appreciated (at least in September 1950) Plato’s 
“allegories, the myths” – but not his arguments.53 This appreciation of the poetic in Plato fits well 
with the choice of syncretistic form for the PI. 
Is there an opposition between poetic and syncretistic philosophy on the one hand and 
analytic philosophy on the other? The Wittgenstein of the 1930 preface drafts and also of the PI 
seems to have seen a deep opposition between the two. The PI’s form and philosophy were 
intended as alternatives and in opposition to forms of analytic philosophy, which Wittgenstein 
found in his time was becoming more and more dominant. But independently of whether one will 
agree with Wittgenstein on whether there is such an opposition, one will have to recognize and 
acknowledge that the Wittgenstein of the PI seems to have considered the syncretistic a required 
part of philosophical writing and also of philosophy as such – the syncretistic has to be a feature of 
both the process and the work. This already seems to be enough of a challenge, a challenge not 








1. Ortner 2000, 505 ff. 
2. Ortner’s complete list of writing strategies includes: (1) writing in one go; (2) writing of one 
idea to one text version; (3) writing of one idea to several text versions; (4) writing, through 
several text versions, of one idea to several new ideas; (5) planning with subsequent writing 
out of the plan; (6) writing down of text-externally elaborated results; (7) linear step-by-step 
writing; (8) syncretistic writing; (9) writing of parts; (10) puzzle-writing (“Puzzle-
Schreiben”). Ortner’s German labels and short descriptions are as follows: (1) “(Scheinbar) 
nicht-zerlegendes Schreiben. Schreiben in einem Zug, Schreiben im Stil der pensée parlée, 
écriture automatique. Typ des Aus-dem-Bauch-heraus-(=Flow)Schreibers”; (2) “Einen Text 
zu einer Idee schreiben. Typ des Einzigtext-, des Einen-Text-zu-einer-Idee-Schreibers”; (3) 
“Schreiben von Textversionen zu einer Idee. Typ des Mehrversionenschreibers, des 
Versionenneuschreibers”; (4) “Herstellen von Texten über die redaktionelle Arbeit an 
Texten (Vorfassungen), von verbesserten Versionen durch Arbeit am vorliegenden Text. 
Typ des Text-aus-den-Korrekturen-Entwicklers”; (5) “Planendes Schreiben (Plan = eine 
Version in Kurzschrift). Typ des Planers”; (6) “Einfälle außerhalb eines Textes 
weiterentwickeln. Konzeptuell extralingual + niederschreibend. Typ des Niederschreibers”; 
(7) “Schrittweises Vorgehen – der Produktionslogik folgend. Typ des Schritt-für-Schritt-
Schreibers”; (8) “Synkretistisch-schrittweises Schreiben. Typ des Synkretisten”; (9) 
“Moderat produktzerlegend. Das Schreiben von Produktsegmenten. Typ des 
Textteilschreibers”; (10) “Schreiben nach dem Puzzle-Prinzip. Extrem produktzerlegend. 
Typ des Produkt-Zusammensetzers”. My view is that Wittgenstein’s writing contains 
exemplifications of all of these strategies, but that the Wittgenstein of the PI is best 
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classified and described as a syncretistic writer (strategy 8). Ortner, however, classifies 
Wittgenstein as a puzzle-writer (strategy 10). 
3. I distinguish two main phases: from 1929 to 1943, with the “Urfassung” (1937) and “Pre-
war” (1938), and from 1943 to 1951, with the “Intermediate” and “Final” versions as the 
high peaks. 
4. Translations of terminology and quotations from Ortner into English are mine. 
5. Pichler 2009, 57-97. 
6. See Biggs and Pichler 1993, 50 ff.   
7. For more details on this and the following issue see Pichler 1997, 38 ff. 
8. See more on this in Pichler 1994, 91 ff. For examples stemming from the genesis of PI §§1-
4 see Pichler 1997, sect. 2. 
9. Allan Janik connects Wittgenstein’s writing of alternatives with Hertz’s concern “for 
showing us how alternative modes of presentation and representation can dissolve 
philosophical problems” (2006, 60). 
10. Pichler 2004. 78 ff. 
11. Also the deviation from this principle is significant: see the transition from TLP 2 to TLP 3 
and from TLP 3 to TLP 4: “logisches Bild” / “logical picture” is the only term exempted 
from the a is b – b is c – c is d schema (see Stenius 1969, 18 ff., and Erbacher 2010, 82). 
12. See Bazzocchi 2008, 125-40. 
13. Pichler 2004.  
14. According to Janik, Wittgenstein inherited the ideal of ”Lückenlosigkeit” from Frege, but 
saw eventually that ”only such a seeming potpourri of fragments could fittingly express his 
message” (2006, 108). 
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15. Pichler 1997. 
16. See ibid., 78 ff. 
17. See for example Savigny 1991, 307-19. 
18. See esp. TS 212.  
19. It has been standard to present the story as though the so-called PI philosophy chapter had 
been more or less taken over from the Big Typescript (see esp. Hilmy 1987). In my opinion, 
this view has, however, been successfully challenged by Stern (2006, 205-29), Pichler 
(2007, 123-44) and, more recently, Conant (2011, 620-45). 
20. Ortner 2000, 543 ff. 
21. “Ich verwende den Begriff synkretistisch als Gegenbegriff zu linear geordnet-
fortschreibend-diskursiv.” (Ortner 2000, 496) 
22. For examples see Ortner 2000, 491 ff. 
23. See Pichler 2004, 199 ff. 
24. Ortner 2000, 497. 
25. Ibid., 496. 
26. I do not claim that Wittgenstein wrote no aphorisms; most of the remarks published in 
Vermischte Bemerkungen / Culture and Value are in my view aphoristic. 
27. The two lists are based on material published earlier (Pichler 2009; taken, with revisions, 
from Wittgenstein: Como ler o album? Organized by Arley R. Moreno. Published by 
Coleção CLE, Campinas, Brazil. Used by permission of the publisher).  
28. Ibid. 
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29. “Ein weiterer Ertrag dieser Strategie: Gedanken – solange die Tätigkeit des Schreibens 
dauert, Gedanken bis zum letzten Augenblick, Gedanken auch, die erst beim Schreiben 
entstehen” (Ortner 2000, 529). 
30. So far there has been relatively little discussion of Wittgenstein’s “album”. Exceptions 
include Binkley (1973), Schobinger (1991), Pichler (2004), Moreno (2009), Gründler 
(2011), Keicher (2011, with a focus on Wittgenstein’s photo album) and, most recently, 
Gorlée (2012). Moreno calls the process which led up to the PI, Wittgenstein’s “Big Diary”; 
the PI “album” is one of several possible outcomes from that process. Gorlée provides a 
comprehensive investigation of Wittgenstein’s “album” and related notions such as 
“fragment” and “fragmentariness” from a semiotic point of view. 
31. Ortner 2000, 533, 535-6. 
32. Ibid., 493. 
33. Pichler 2004, 136. 
34. One should expect that a study of the Skinner Wittgenstein materials (see Gibson 2010) 
would shed additional light on the move from the Brown Book to the PI. 
35. My translation; the original German reads: “Wittgenstein, sagte Moore weiter, habe ihm 
erklärt, er sei im Brown Book der falschen Methode gefolgt, in diesem Manuskript dagegen 
habe er die richtige Methode angewandt. Moore gab zu, er wisse nicht, was Wittgenstein 
damit meinte.” (EPB, 12 ff.) 
36. I quote from a Wittgenstein Nachlass typescript which contains the English translation of 
the German “Pre-war version” of the PI preface and was edited and published by 
Venturinha (2010). This typescript was discovered only recently and is kept in the Austrian 
National Library under Cod. Ser. N. 39,544. The original German is in TS 225.  
“The Philosophical Investigations and Syncretistic Writing” (Draft!), publ. in: N. Venturinha (ed.): The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Routledge 2013. 
 
 26 
37. Pichler 2004, 62. 
38. Josef Rothhaupt has recently suggested the fragment was the compound of MS 140, MS 
114 and MS 115 (2011, 249); Peter Keicher has earlier suggested it is the first remark of 
MS 116 (2000, 225 ff.). But these items can only be the “fragment” inasmuch as they can be 
shown to exemplify the criss-cross method. In my view, it is MS 142 and TS 220 which do 
this much better than any other piece up to 1938.  
39. On this see more in Pichler 2004, 222 ff. 
40. The Nachlass source is MS 109, 200 ff., from November 1930. For a brief general study of 
all of Wittgenstein’s (drafts for) prefaces, see Keicher 2004. 
41. Carnap 1967, XVII. The original German from Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) – 
which Wittgenstein must have alluded to – reads: “… es wird in langsamem, vorsichtigem 
Aufbau Erkenntnis nach Erkenntnis gewonnen … So wird sorgsam Stein zu Stein gefügt 
und ein sicherer Bau errichtet, an dem jede folgende Generation weiterschaffen kann.” 
(1961, XVIII ff.) I discuss the contrasting relation between Carnap’s 1928 preface and 
Wittgenstein’s 1930 preface draft more comprehensively in Pichler 2009. The view that 
Wittgenstein’s 1930 preface draft might refer to Carnap’s preface to his Aufbau was to my 
knowledge first defended by Georg Henrik von Wright (1993, 97 ff.). On Wittgenstein’s 
similar relation to Russell’s conception of philosophy see Baker and Hacker 1983, 259 ff. 
42. Conant 2011, 632 and 640.  
43. Conant puts strong emphasis on the year 1937 and that it was in that year that Wittgenstein 
awoke to a new conception of philosophy: “It is this conception of what he seeks, in seeking 
the method of philosophy, that Wittgenstein finally came to abandon in Norway in 1937” 
(ibid., 642). I think that if a date is stressed, it should be November 1936 when Wittgenstein 
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embarked on the syncretistic “Urfassung” of the PI in MS 142. If the PI’s philosophical 
methods are tied to the syncretistic and the album form (as I have tried to show), then 
Wittgenstein’s new conception of philosophy is practised from November 1936 onwards. 
Wittgenstein’s spring 1937 work on the PI’s “chapter on philosophy”, which is the focus of 
Conant’s claim, is definitely a crucial element in expressing this new conception of 
philosophy, but it is just that: an expression of an old conception abandoned and a new one 
already found and practised. Thus, I see the 1937 “meta-philosophical” remarks as a 
reflection upon and stock-taking and documentation of a philosophical practice since 
November 1936 which sought expression and documentation, rather than as the mark of a 
new beginning. Naturally, as Conant himself states (ibid., 624), any talk of terminus post or 
ante quem can be misleading, but if one wants to invoke a date (as Conant himself does), it 
is November 1936 rather than spring 1937. Stressing the later date blurs the point which 
Conant himself wants to emphasize in the end: with the shift to the PI, a change in methods 
and practice took place rather than only a change in the conception of methods and practice. 
Conant’s emphasis on 1937 could, however, be defended if one could show that 
Wittgenstein’s spring 1937 work on the “chapter on philosophy” had a significant 
retroactive effect, so that the MS 142 material written before underwent renewed editing 
along with, or subsequent to, the meta-philosophical work. 
44. Pichler 2007, 130. 
45. Conant 2011, 643. 
46. Ortner’s terminology is: “Wissen wiedergebend”, “Wissen erweiternd” and “Wissen 
schaffend” (2000, 348). 
47. Ibid., 537. 
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48. See for example Gabriel 1991. 
49. Gabriel 2012, 170.  
50. The Nachlass source is MS 146, 25v, with its fair copy version in MS 115, 30). 
51. Carnap 1967, XVI ff. The original German reads: “… Das hat zur Folge, dass die strenge 
und verantwortungsbewusste Grundhaltung des wissenschaftlichen Forschers auch als 
Grundhaltung des philosophisch Arbeitenden erstrebt wird, während die Haltung des 
Philosophen alter Art mehr der eines Dichters gleicht … Aus dieser Forderung zur 
Rechtfertigung und zwingenden Begründung einer jeden These ergibt sich die Ausschaltung 
des spekulativen, dichterischen Arbeitens in der Philosophie. …” (Carnap 1961, XVIII ff.) 
52. In Pichler 2004 I have made an attempt at explicating this functionality in some detail. 
53. Bouwsma 1986, 60 ff. 
54. This paper has come about through presentations at a number of conferences and meetings: 
in Aachen (2010, org. K. Herrmann, D. van Hulle and A. Gellhaus), Innsbruck (2011, org. 
A. Janik, U. Lobis and J. Wang), Marifjøra (2011, org. K. S. Johannessen and S. Säätelä) 
and Paris (2012, org. A. Soulez). I want to thank these meetings’ organizers and participants 
for helpful discussion. For valuable comments I also want to thank H.-W. Gabler, Gottfried 
Gabriel, D.L. Gorlee, J. Klagge, A. Moreno, D. Smith (who also helped me with translating 
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